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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY RAY REEVES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v, 
GEIGY PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., 
a division of CIBA-GEIGY 
CORPORATION, a New York 
corporation; ELI LILLY & 
COMPANY, an Indiana corporation; 
and GERALD R. MORESS, M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Case No. 860409 
13-B 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment 
in favor of the respondents in view of the plaintiff's 
failure to file affidavits or produce other evidence 
demonstrating a genuine dispute as to any material fact? 
provides: 
APPLICABLE STATUTE 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was a products liability case coupled with a 
medical malpractice action in which it was alleged that the 
plaintiff sustained burns over approximately fifty-five 
percent of his body after using Phenobarbital manufactured by 
defendant Eli Lilly & Co., and Tegretol, manufactured by 
the defendant Geigy Pharmaceutical, both of which had been 
prescribed by the defendant Gerald R. Moress, M.D., as anti-
convulsants. The plaintiff filed suit on February 8, 1984. 
After considerable discovery, the defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment on April 28, 1986. The motions were initially 
scheduled to be heard on May 19, 1986, but were postponed 
pursuant to a 56(f) motion and affidavit filed by the 
plaintiff. On June 2, 1986, Judge J. Dennis Frederick granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff 
failed to file affidavits or point to any other evidence 
demonstrating any genuine dispute as to material fact. The 
plaintiff appeals Judge Frederick's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Larry Reeves was born December 5, 
1961. In about 1974, while in sixth grade, he began 
experiencing epileptic seizures for which he was initially seen 
by Dr. Levere Poulson, who prescribed Phenobarbital. 
(Depo. of Mrs. Alma Look pp. 16-17.) 
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2, I11- Poulson referred the plaintiff X.:i Dr. 
Fljiiiiin'l M I s t e i n mi n e u r o s u r g e o n wh>i t r e a t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f 
f r o m 19'ib t o \^"h buiubiein JPIIHIJ un l Mir i nnvnLsive 
J i w i r d e r and p r e s c r i b e d D i l a n t i n and P h e n o b a r t o i u ' 
in f i ' t i v e m e d i c a t i o n . ( I d . a t i) , 19 -28 , ) 
i i i i t i t i f f hocame d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h Di • 
G o l d s t e i n and c o n s u l t e d wi l l ' an i" 11* > m innnniJi ' - i , 
F tn i i suke Matsuo , at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Utah Med ica l Cen 
K.t-iiiin n \n Dr Matsuo m a i n t a i n e d p l a i n t i f f on 
a n t i - s e a zm e i t i idn. i l n i "•! m n i i .uif i n V a l p r o i c Acid 
and M e s a n t o i n . ( I d . a t p p . 2 9-J«. -
i th Hi „ U o l d s t e i n and Dr. MaJ u"^-q 
I f i i ui i i nl ' ' liiu t h e s e i z u r e s (I J . a ) 
J , Ilitf pJriii i ii i IJI - l i ss^ t is* ' i Dr, 
Fumisuke Matsuo and on recommendation f'i'oiri i)t,\ > , 
saw the defendant Dr. Moress, a neurologist, on August 2, 
1980 (I i 
» , in , Moress beqan maiuyi j»"j " * i,"ir*-» 
disorder and saw plaintiff intermittently during the year J"U 
v. I In .1 i - I i I'Mi I ?"1 1 ii'i O c t o b e r /H I 9 H I e m b e r t. , 
1 9 8 0 , a n d t h e n m l . n i m i , n i n I M . I mi l ia ry " ,"M ]l ' id 
Sep tember 4, 1981 , w i t h a f i n a l V I L I L UI i "4»ienti>er ", 
Dili" i mi t:h • n * imp f r dim , l)t Moress pri; ,s i i l r l Pi 1 n m t i n , 
P h e n o b a r b j Lri i , in niiilinii mul 1'earetol , As of t h e l a s t v i s i 
p l a i n t i f f was t a k i n g b'^'h t'eqt et u i n i » "n MI 4 M r n 11 \ M I a t 
p p . 4 0 - 7 9 . , 
3 
7. On October 31, 1981, at approximately 7:30 
a.m., the plaintiff noted that the top layer of his skin began 
peeling off after taking a shower. He was admitted into the 
University Medical Center where he was treated by Dr. Glen 
Warden. Approximately fifty-five percent of the plaintiff's 
superficial skin peeled off. Seven days after admission, an 
additional ten percent of his skin peeled off. (Warden Depo. 
pp. 5-10.) (R. at 212) 
8. The plaintiff was initially diagnosed as 
suffering from Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN), which is a 
dermatological disorder which results in loss of skin at 
various degrees. The etiology is unknown. (Warden Depo. 
pp. 12-13.) (R. at 212) 
9. The burns plaintiff suffered were full 
thickness, meaning that they were third degree, extending 
entirely through the skin. (Warden Depo. p. 21.) (R. at 212) 
10. Plaintiff was treated for his burns at the 
University Medical Center until November 25, 1981. 
Thereafter, he had several additional admissions for the 
purpose of treating the burns and receiving skin grafts. 
Plaintiff has reached maximum improvement with respect to the 
burn injury. (Warden Depo. pp. 59-65.) (R. at 212) 
11. On February 8, 1984, the plaintiff filed suit 
against the defendants Geigy Pharmaceutical, Ciba-Geigy 
Corporation ("Geigy"), Eli Lilly & Co. ("Lilly"), and 
Dr. Moress. Defendant Geigy manufactured Tegretol, 
defendant Lilly manufactured Phenobarbital, and defendant 
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Moress prescribed Tegretol and Phenobarbital to the 
pia int.1 * f |' i "  i|1|i| i ' ' ill eqed that the Tegretol an . 4 he 
Phenobarbital caused the b u m I 1... i ! A I r,„f' iff "s body, .. ~ 
-/ 
1 » ^ r e a f t e r , t h e p a r t i e s engaged 
d i s c o v e r v . I,I |ii i i i i - i t e r r o q a t o r i e s tu - p e n d a n t s 
Mor- LJ i l y and G e i g y . P l a i n t iff a 1 • t e \nttA t 1| 
•""* i \ r t i o n of documents Iioui t he d H ' ^ t u l a n t s L i l l y and 
Ea ':h If tprvl'if.t r e sponded f u l l y and c o m p l e t e l y t o t h e 
-•-very J eques t s . iudiU> i | im i u i i f . (See,, i- i j . 
. , . i t 581 | I ' , i . '9, J L ' ( I H) 
3 ! [n a d d i t i o n t o d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t s , f i v e 
rfonnci-i I, j i i
 Wi I ,n i t4io.i| i ii|iii A,uqus+ ' ' , oi < ' , p l a i n t i f f deposed 
* *• -*1:en<iinq p h y s i c * in d r h Wi i I ml "1 
1 4 . On December 18, , i • e n d a n t s a e p u s e d 
M n,;l,,iait, 1 l I I ' iepkor ir . Pi I n had pe r fo rmed t e s t s 
on t h e p i a nil: i t i >, i ' i j M p s y on November z , xu i i i , 
(R. a t -.! I '") 
15. on December ]y , IHHI , d e f e n d a n t s deposed Dr. 
JV-JJ i 'iiu In * in ' - - ft i ' a t e d t h o p l a i n t i f f and pe r fo rmed 
p a t h o l o g y t e s t s on tuiit n» 
,
 0 n December 1/ ami in , I Al L, L1. .' l e l e m l i ' 
ili'posr^I Mil nAlma Lamai Conk, t h e p l a i n t i f f "s m o t h e r , 
D e f e n d a n t s a l s , 1 uepo,seu in.1 p l a i n t " " • Based upon t h i s 
thorough rh recovery, ^^}e d e f e n d a n t s l i n n HUM ion Ini iiiim n . 
judgment in Apr i l I ",M over two year ' s a f t e r t h e Complaint had 
been t i n 1 • ' i n i) 
17. At the time the defendants filed their 
motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff had no outstanding 
discovery demands. 
18. The defendants1 motion for summary judgment 
was supported by the affidavits of Dr. Joel A. Thompson and 
Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer. (R. at 158, 162) 
19. Dr. Thompson, through his affidavit, testified 
that he was familiar with the standard of care required by 
physicians and hospitals in Salt Lake City, Utah, during the 
time frame the plaintiff was treated. Dr. Thompson testified 
that "the choice of medications prescribed by Dr. Moress and 
the dosages were appropriate for the type of seizure condition 
that Mr. Reeves had, and appropriate based upon his past 
history and unresponsiveness to prior medication use." Dr. 
Thompson further stated that Dr. Moress had complied with the 
degree of care, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and 
provided by other neurologists in good standing in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and that the allegations that Dr. Moress was 
negligent and had committed malpractice in the treatment of the 
plaintiff's seizure condition were not supported by the 
record. (R. at 162-165) 
20. Dr. Swinyer testified that the Tegretol and 
the Phenobarbital prescribed for the plaintiff by Dr. Moress 
"were not the cause of Mr. Reeves' skin disorder." (R. at 
158-161) 
21. Defendants' motions for summary judgment were 
initially scheduled to be heard on May 19, 1986. Notice of the 
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hearing di.tr yas sent to the plaintiff on April 2R and April 
II Il  I I f»| (/
 i( III III III I III ! i 
, A l | i tresporist I lUmmdvy "ninqmrnii mot inn'-., 
affidavits and notices of hearing, the plaintiff, m , 
198* mi t tn U.R.C.P. 56(f) for an Order extending 
, «KU ., • ovei'j lll,r1 f",,|, p >L't }Mini nq the summary judgement 
* _, port of tne motion pj \ i i i i i «b .-»*• i urni,'/ i i 
affidavit that she had not had adequate nJme to conduct 
suf i i-Mf i \ , i fi ill 1 8 6 - 1 9 0 ) 
2 3 mi I u i 111 i f I" ' i iii mi I I mi mi I mi I mi I 
.'r'l Eidavit» t h e h e a r i n g was p o s t p o n e d >,t i 1 ,,'une ,.,1" ,„ 198b. 
p l a i n t i f f prepared and s i g n e d t h e Amended "Notice of Hearing, 
( P , •• i l o i ). • • 
2 4 N e v e r t h e l e s s , at I li In i i n IIHM1U!P " in in 
Fredericks on June 2, 1986, the plaintiff failed to produce 
a n y 1 «i f f i iiii«.,,i" i I s .'wi ' invert inq those I I I ed by the defendants and 
failed to produce any eviu^i" v " < ,' "i*1"' »H» »iispute :ss to i 
material fact. , I he plaintiff failed to provide .-u),l( aiiuM i 
sfafement or other evidence indicating that Fhenobarba tal diid 
Tegretol cause-d I,I III.II I ill ti\ i Iisnr. . i i-r that 
defendant Moress acted negligent ly I '/ |,'" > , 1 i , " 1 . 1ii,«r. 
Accordingly, the court reviewed the affidavits of nr Inoiopboii 
Hun III . . iw I nyoi > a I the depositions of Dr. WaruLii, in 
Dr. Piepkorn, the iilcuiil ill uml II i I A i r tiff's mother, and 
finding no disputed facts, granted tin. de 1 einJjin iiu ' «» ' rir 
summary judgment. (K. «L 196-198) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment based upon the failure of the 
plaintiff to produce any affidavit or other evidence sufficient 
to establish a genuine dispute as to any material fact. The 
plaintiff had ample time to pursue discovery. There were no 
outstanding discovery requests or scheduled depositions when 
the defendants filed their motions for summary judgment over 
two years after the Complaint was filed. Plaintiff could not 
dispute the defendants' clear evidence that Phenobarbital and 
Tegretol did not injure the plaintiff, and that Dr. Moress 
had not breached any standard of care by prescribing those 
drugs to the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
In his February 8, 1984 Complaint, the plaintiff 
claimed that in October, 1981, Tegretol and Phenobarbital 
combined to cause his skin disorder. After two years of 
discovery by interrogatories, requests for production of 
documents and five depositions, this allegation remained 
completely unsupported. The depositions of Dr. Zone, Dr. 
Piepkorn and Dr. Warden completely failed to substantiate 
plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff's primary treating physician, 
Dr. Warden, affirmed that the etiology of plaintiff's skin 
8 
problems was unknown. (Ward Depo. pp. 12-13. R. at 212.) Dr. 
Michael W. Piepkorn, a nationally known and respected board 
certified general pathologist, dermatologist and skin 
pathologist at the University of Utah Medical Center, performed 
a skin biopsy on tissue taken from the burn site of plaintiff's 
skin disorders. His histological examination showed that the 
skin and tissue loss were not caused by drugs. (Piepkorn 
Depo. pp. 28-29. R. at 210.) 
Dr. John Zone, a respected dermatologist at the 
University of Utah with special training in immunopathology, 
also tested specimens obtained from the plaintiff. Dr. Zone 
concluded that the plaintiff's drug history did not fit the 
classic pattern for causing skin disorders and that the cause 
of plaintiff's problem was simply unknown. (Zone Depo. at 
pp. 28, 56-57. R. at 211.) 
Further, the affidavits of Dr. Thompson and Dr. 
Swinyer fully refuted the plaintiff's allegation that 
Tegretol and Phenobarbital somehow caused his skin disorder and 
that Dr. Moress committed malpractice by prescribing the 
drugs. Dr. Swinyer testified that Phenobarbital and Tegretol 
did not cause the plaintiff's skin disorders. Dr. Thompson 
agreed that Dr. Moress acted properly by prescribing 
Phenobarbital and Tegretol to the plaintiff. According to all 
of the medical experts in this case, Phenobarbital and Tegretol 
were not connected to the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. 
In Utah it is the plaintiff's burden to establish by 
expert medical testimony the physician's standard of care and 
9 
that his behavior failed to conform to the proper standard. In 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980), the 
Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff must introduce expert 
testimony to establish the proper standard of care: 
In a majority of malpractice cases, the 
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony 
to establish this standard of care. Expert 
testimony is required because the nature of 
the profession removes the particularities 
of its practice from the knowledge and 
understanding of the average citizen. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed 
plaintiff's obligations in medical malpractice actions in 
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982), stating: 
Absent a situation where the propriety of 
the treatment received is within the common 
law and experience of a layman, the 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case 
must prove the standard of care by expert 
medical testimony. 
Expert testimony is also required to causally connect Pheno-
barbital and Tegretol to plaintiff's injuries. The only 
exception to the expert witness rule occurs in situations where 
the treatment is within a layman's knowledge and experience. 
This exception has been applied by the Utah Supreme Court in 
situations where a physician loses a surgical instrument during 
an operation or performs an operation on the wrong part of the 
body. In such instances, "it would seem as a matter of common 
sense that scientific opinion would throw little light on the 
subject." Frederickson v. Maw, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (Utah 
1951). 
The instant case is not one which can be determined 
simply by the common sense of a layman. Whether the drugs 
10 
caused plaintiff's injury required expert opinion. Therefore, 
the plaintiff had the duty to present some evidence to dispute 
the affidavit and deposition testimony of the defendants. The 
plaintiff produced no evidence that Dr. Moress departed from 
a proper standard of care or that Phenobarbital and Tegretol 
caused the plaintiff's injury. On the other hand, Dr. 
Swinyer and Dr. Thompson, through their affidavits, 
established that the care and treatment given the plaintiff 
complied with acceptable medical standards and that the 
Phenobarbital and Tegretol were not linked to plaintiff's 
burns. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting the defendant's motions. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION. 
Despite the postponement of the summary judgment 
hearing until June 2, 1986, the plaintiff did not produce a 
single affidavit contradicting Dr. Swinyer or Dr. Thompson, 
and could not point to any evidence supporting his claim that 
some defect in Phenobarbital and Tegretol caused his injury. 
On May 6, 1986, the plaintiff's counsel had filed a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit stating she had not had "adequate time and do not now 
have time to conduct sufficient discovery regarding the facts 
of this case. . . . " (R. at 186-190) The trial court properly 
rejected plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion and affidavit. 
11 
Rule 56(f) grants a trial court discretion to make 
any just order where a non-moving party fails to respond by 
contradicting affidavits to a summary judgment motion. 
Rule 56(f) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or it may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
In every case where a party files a 56(f) affidavit, 
the trial court has broad discretion to determine the proper 
course of action. The courts review the "reasons stated" by 
the attorney or party for failure to present contradicting 
affidavits and determine whether the circumstances justify an 
extension of time to extend discovery and continue the summary 
judgment hearing. The 56(f) affidavit "directly and 
forthrightly invokes the trial courtfs discretion," Strand v. 
Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 
194 (Utah 1977) (quoting Moore's Federal Practice, 2d Ed., 
§56-24 pages 56-14-24 to 15-14-26), which will only be 
disturbed on appeal if the final decision reflects an abuse of 
that discretion. Id. Where the 56(f) affidavit results from 
dilatory discovery practices, lacks merit, or presents 
inadequate reasons for failure to produce contradicting 
affidavits, the trial court may properly grant summary 
judgment. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-313 (Utah 
1984). Further, Rule 56(f) should not be applied to postpone 
12 
summary judgment where there is no reason to believe that the 
discovery would lead to the denial of the motion, (see 
generally, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, 
§27-40 through §28-41, 2d Ed., 1983, construing the 
identical federal role), or where there has been sufficient 
"time to utilize discovery proceedings prior to the hearing or 
summary judgment." Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 313. 
Likewise, in Rule 56(f) cases where substantial discovery has 
been completed and the facts elicited by the discovery do not, 
in any way, support the plaintiff's claims, a court's decision 
to grant summary judgment motion is justified. Burlington 
Coat Factory Warehouse, Corp. v. Espirit De Corp., 597 
F.Supp 1199 (D.C.N.Y. 1984), affirmed in part, reversed on 
other grounds in part, 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1985). The 
Burington trial court explained: 
A granting of a continuance under Rule 
56(f) has been considered to be 
inappropriate in cases in which substantial 
discovery has been conducted, and 
plaintiff's action appears groundless. 
Id. at 1202. 
The courts have repeatedly emphasized that a dilatory 
plaintiff cannot rely on Rule 56(f). In Paul Kadair, Inc. v. 
Sony Corp. of America, 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983), the 
district court, in construing the identical federal rule, 
denied the plaintiff's Rule 56(f) request to postpone summary 
judgment and continue discovery, finding the plaintiff's 
failure to pursue discovery for over a year prior to the 
hearing dilatory. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
13 
plaintiff's one-year delay was a substantial factor supporting 
the trial court1s discretion. The Court explained that where a 
plaintiff fails to produce specific facts after adequate 
discovery to support its allegations a trial court may properly 
refuse to permit discovery. Something more than a "fanciful 
allegation is required to justify denying a motion for summary 
judgment when the moving party has met its burden of 
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material 
fact.11 Id. at 1030, quoting Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. 
United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2nd Cir. 
1981). 
The courts have also delineated factors to aid in 
determining whether a party is dilatory in order to assess a 
Rule 56(f) motion. Relevant factors include: 1) the length of 
the pendency of the case prior to the Rule 56(f) request; 2) 
whether and when the plaintiff could have anticipated the need 
for the requested discovery; 3) plaintiff's previous efforts, 
if any, to obtain the needed information; 4) the degree or 
nature of discovery already undertaken; 5) any limitations 
placed upon discovery previously by the trial court; 6) any 
prior solicitations of or provisions for discovery by the trial 
court; 7) any warning to plaintiff that, absent a speedy 
request, discovery might be denied and his claim dismissed; 
and, 8) whether the requested information was inaccessible to 
the plaintiff, e.g., as when within defendant's exclusive 
control, or whether alternative, accessable sources existed 
but were foregone. Kadair v. Sony, 694 F.2d at 1031. 
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In the instant case, the trial court properly 
rejected the plaintiff's 56(f) affidavit. The affidavit lacked 
merit, presented inadequate reasons to continue discovery, and 
resulted from dilatory discovery. 
First, the plaintiff's 56(f) affidavit lacked merit 
and presented inadequate reasons to continue discovery. The 
affidavit did not explain or justify the plaintiff's inability 
to dispute defendants' affidavits and evidence. The affidavit 
merely stated that the plaintiff's attorney did "not have 
adequate time and do not now have time to conduct sufficient 
discovery regarding the facts of this case . . . " R. at 189. 
The affidavit offered no explanation why plaintiff had not 
pursued discovery against any of the defendants for over a year 
prior to the defendants' filing for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's last discovery request to the defendants was filed 
on January 30, 1985. Fifteen months later, the plaintiff's 
attorney filed an affidavit that she had not had sufficient 
time to complete discovery. The affidavit failed to provide 
any reason for the 15-month delay and was properly rejected 
by the trial court. 
Next, the plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion resulted from 
dilatory practices and does not meet the standard in Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d at 312-313. The factors delineated in 
Kadair v. Sony, 694 F.2d at 1031 also weigh heavily 
against the defendant. First, this case was over two years' 
old when defendants filed their motions for summary judgment. 
As noted, the plaintiff's last discovery requests to the 
15 
defendants were filed on January 30, 1985, 15 months prior to 
the summary judgment hearing. 
Second, the plaintiff should have anticipated the 
need for the requested discovery. At the outset of the case, 
it was apparent that expert medical testimony would be required 
against Dr. Moress and to link Phenobarbital and Tegretol to 
the plaintiff1 skin disorders. Despite the clearly anticipated 
need for such evidence, the plaintiff did not obtain expert 
testimony and could not point to any evidence contradicting the 
defendants1 affidavits. Moreover, under Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is required to investigate 
the factual and legal basis for suit prior to filing a 
complaint in order to ensure that the allegations are well 
grounded in fact and legally warranted. The rule properly 
requires consultation with experts prior to filing the 
complaint to confirm the factual basis asserted for liability. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff did not consult any expert 
willing to support the allegations in the complaint or 
contradict Dr. Thompson or Dr. Swinyer. 
Third, significant and substantial discovery has 
already been completed. The plaintiff's brief concedes that 
plaintiff received thousands of pages of documents during 
discovery and that five individuals were deposed. Never-
theless, there is not any evidence to support plaintiff's 
allegations and no showing that further discovery would have 
been anything but cumulative and wasteful. Finally, no prior 
limitation was placed upon the plaintiff's discovery efforts by 
16 
the trial court. The plaintiff was given ample time and 
latitude to prepare his case. 
Plaintiff had more than sufficient "time to utilize 
discovery proceedings prior to the hearing for summary 
judgment,M Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 313 and yet failed to 
produce any evidence supporting his complaint. Substantial 
discovery has been completed, and there is no evidence 
contraverting the defendant's evidence. Summary judgment 
was justified and the trial court properly denied the Rule 
56(f) motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants request 
this Court to affirm the trial court's order of summary 
judgment dismissing the plaintiff with prejudice and on the 
merits• 
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